Chongryon: North Korea’s Outpost in Japan
Chongryon
North Korea’s Outpost in Japan
By Samantha Surdek
While Japan is typically perceived as a homogenous society, the region is home to a plethora of ethnic minorities: most notably, Chinese, Koreans, Filipinos, and Brazilians.[i] The historical myth of Japanese homogeneity perpetuates a culture of nationalism while simultaneously rejecting the struggle of disenfranchised ethnic minorities.[ii] Despite being one of the largest ethnic groups in Japan, Koreans have nonetheless suffered in this nativist society. While born in Japan, Zainichi Koreans bear a label that is literally translated as “residing in Japan,” reflecting a temporary sense of their residence.[iii] Historically, Zainichi Koreans have faced routine political discrimination, barred from certain employment, housing, and educational opportunities. While these institutional restrictions largely disappeared in the 1970s, the social divide and consequent xenophobia remain, manifesting in hate speech and direct violence.[iv] Despite attempts to curtail hate speech in 2016, such efforts to promote inclusivity have, for the most part, fallen short.[v] The 2019 United States Report on Human Rights Practices found that “hate speech and hate crimes against ethnic Koreans were particularly prominent and numerous… There is no evidence of increased societal acceptance of ethnic Koreans.”[vi]
Faced with an increasingly hostile environment, Zainichi Koreans are left feeling disenchanted, yearning to reconnect with their Korean roots.[vii] Chongryon have managed to maintain a relative amount of success as a North Korean ideological and political group that seeks to promote a shared North Korean identity within Japan. While it was once a financial powerhouse, the group seems to be on the decline: its membership is one-sixth of what it once was, its headquarters was forcibly auctioned off by a Japanese court, and it owes $750 million to the Japanese government following the group’s inability to pay its debts.[viii] Clearly, the group’s financial base is quickly deteriorating. However, it would be premature to declare the group’s demise. Rather, Chongryon has diverted attention from its financial woes, choosing to operate more as a political and cultural entity. The organization holds continued appeal to Zainichi Koreans that seek to connect intimately with North Korea in ways that Japan limits. In a cultural and political way, Chongryon is able to form borders of inclusivity for Zainichi Koreans.Yet, as Chongryon takes on an increasing political role in Japanese-North Korean relations, its source of cultural identity comes under increasing threat.
Past and Present of the Chongryon
The cultural and political alienation of ethnic Koreans can be traced back to Japanese imperialism in the early twentieth century. During Japanese imperial rule of the peninsula between 1910 and 1945, Koreans were treated as a subordinate group who “could be saved only by the divine intervention of the Japanese emperor.”[ix] In short, ethnic Koreans were exploited and oppressed for Japanese gains. By the fall of the Japanese Empire in 1945, there were two million Koreans living in Japan, many of whom worked and fought for the empire in World War II.[x] Eventually, the majority of Koreans were repatriated to the Korean peninsula by 1954, mainly South Korea, while some 556,000 remained in Japan.[xi]
The Koreans remaining in Japan after 1945 faced a wildly different reality. Under Japanese imperial rule, despite the routine discrimination against Zainichi Koreans by the government, Japan was still an aspiring hetereogenous empire. As Japan lost its empire in 1945, it also lost control of foreign states and a significant amount of ethnic populations, relinquishing its status as a multiethnic state. This new Japan, focused on constructing a new homogeneous identity, passed a series of anti-Korean legislations, chiefly the Alien Registration Law of 1952, designating Koreans as “foreigners for the time being.”[xii] As a result, Koreans were increasingly marginalized, living as subhumans in their own country of birth. For many, this marked the beginning of state political and cultural discrimination, inspiring a widespread longing to reconnect with their Korean identity and achieve political acceptance in Japan.
This sense of cultural disengagement culminated in the formation of two ideological groups: Chongryon and Mindan. Like their peninsula counterparts, the two are split along ideological lines: Mindan aligned with South Korea’s Rhee regime, while Chongryon looked to the Soviet-backed North Korea. Both groups promote the idea of “long-distance nationalism,” offering many Zainichi Koreans a romanticized opportunity to re-establish ties with their home countries.[xiii] While the majority of Zainichi Koreans trace their lineage to South Korea, most aligned themselves with Chongryon.[xiv] Firstly, North Korean socialism proved attractive to impoverished Zainichi Koreans. While the South Korean President, Syngman Rhee, refused to aid poor Zainichi Koreans, North Korea’s Kim Il-Sung had already been providing financial assistance to Chongryon until the 1990s. The idea of a socialist state was comforting to a number of Zainichi Koreans, who found a rare opportunity to participate in the political apparatus of the state.[xv] Moreover, the North Korean economy was then stronger than South Korea’s, partly owing to both Soviet and Chinese assistance.[xvi] And as a result, many Zainichi Koreans would plan on someday returning to North Korea, a country that was projected as a socialist heaven.[xvii] Finally, Japanese discrimination against Zainichi Koreans pushed them toward the Chongryon identity.[xviii] For example, many Zainichi Koreans chose not to adopt Japanese citizenship, which required them to adopt Japanese last names and compromise their cultural identity.[xix] Hence, a sense of “otherness” that was already common among many Zainichi Koreans simply grew.
Creating Borders within Borders
Given the intense Japanese societal discrimination against Zainichi Koreans, Chongryon has been able to consistently promote a shared North Korea identity. Rather than promote individual thought, Chongryon seeks to teach a communal identity to its children that serves the broader Chongryon community.[xx] Funded by North Korea, Chongryon schools function as a de facto propaganda platform for the Kim regime and serve to educate children in the culture and language of North Korea. Propagandic in nature, the education system establishes a sense of belonging for Zainichi Koreans who are otherwise marginalized in a hostile environment. Through the system, a cycle of self-reliance is formed, as Chongryon members attend school, enroll in university, and find employment within the same North Korean community,[xxi] This marks a stark contrast to the societal oppression and isolation that they regularly encounter outside of the community. In the end, to a group who is consistently oppressed by their native country, the ideas of collectivism and inclusivity are undoubtedly appealing.
As aforementioned, while Chongryon’s education system provides Zainichi Koreans with a framework to participate in their heritage, it is concomitantly able to reinforce loyalty to the North Korean regime through this system. This is especially evident in the importance Koreans in Chongryon place on language. While many Zainichi Korean children will grow up speaking Japanese, Chongryon schools argue that Japanese should only be used exclusively to get by in Japanese society, and Korean should become the language of expressing political matters.[xxii] Consequently, Chongryon Korean consists mainly of North Korean political idioms, lacking emotion and excitement. With this understanding of Korean, which they obtain in schools, Chongryon members are unable to question Chongryon in any meaningful way, strengthening the group’s allegiance to North Korea.[xxiii] Thus, language becomes critical in understanding the members’ long-term loyalty to Chongryon, illustrating how the group is able to promote both North Korean propaganda as well as a sense of political and cultural belonging for Zainichi Koreans.
As Japanese society remains exclusionary towards Zainichi Koreans, North Korea appears to be the only entity aiding their cultural development. Zainichi Koreans operate within a realm of their own, a place where they can reconnect with their heritage and find social acceptance. For many, the only alternative is assimilation, which would deprive them of their cultural identity. A cycle emerges where Zainichi Koreans, finding solace in Chongryon, are discriminated against for their North Korean affiliation, which pushes them deeper into Chongryon. As long as Japanese society remains discriminatory towards Zainichi Koreans, it seems that Chongryon will continue to thrive as a cultural institution.[xxiv]
The Role of the Chongryon in the Future of North Korea-Japanese Relations
Although Chongryon has long served mainly as a cultural institution, over the past two decades, it has assumed a greater role as the de facto embassy of North Korea in Japan.[xxv] Since the 1980s, Chongryon has served as a financial appendage of North Korea, sending money from its financial ventures back to the Kim regime and fostering a strong connection.[xxvi] The group has recently served as the primary facilitator between North Korea and Japan in terms of trade, which potentially foreshadows formal diplomatic relations between the two.[xxvii] In fact, in 2017, the Japanese government conveyed a wish to directly meet with the North Korean government via Chongryon, showing the group’s legitimacy as a diplomatic institution.[xxviii]
Simply put, Chongryon is essential to the North Korean regime as a political institution. The Kim regime sees the organization as an inlet into Japanese politics. As such, Kim Jong Il aims to prevent the group’s decline, which could leave North Korea without direct Japanese intelligence. On the sixtieth anniversary of the Chongryon, Kim Jong Un publicly stressed Chongryon’s value, noting: “[the] party and the government of the Republic will take full responsibility for the fate and future of Chongryon and Koreans in Japan… and will do everything to strengthen and develop the Korean movement in Japan.”[xxix] To further confirm that sentiment, the organization has consistently proved its allegiance and value to the North Korean state, acting as an extension of their dogma and political range.
Currently, relations between North Korea and Japan are at an all time low as both entities debate North Korea’s aggressive missile program and the previous hostage situation. Since Japan and North Korea do not have formal diplomatic ties, Chongryon appears to be the only entity that could address these issues. Given Chongryon’s present role as a conduit for discourse between North Korea and Japan, it is likely that the group will continue to play an important role in facilitating future discussion and diplomatic engagement. As a result, Zainichi Koreans’ identity has become the focus of Japanese attention. With tensions rising between North Korea and Japan, it is increasingly difficult for Japan to justify the existence of a pro-North Korean institution within Japanese borders.[xxx]
Generally, the future appears bleak for Chongryon, with both its membership and financial support declining.[xxxi] While the group continues to persist with support from North Korea, Japan’s hostility towards the group threatens its long-term stability. Chongryon’s increasing role as a political entity detracts from the cultural identity of Chongryon Koreans, only furthering their cultural disorientation in Japan.
Illustration by Ainav Rabinowitz.
[i] Jane H. Yamashiro, “The Social Construction of Race and Minorities in Japan,” Sociology Compass 7, no. 2 (2013): 147–61, https://doi.org/10.1111/soc4.12013.
[ii] Debito Arudou, “‘Homogeneous,’ ‘unique’ Myths Stunt Discourse,” The Japan Times, November 2, 2010, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2010/11/02/issues/homogeneous-unique-myths-stunt-discourse/.
[iii] Lie, John. Zainichi (Koreans in Japan): Diasporic Nationalism and Postcolonial Identity. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008, pg iv-v.
[iv] Bumsoo Kim, “‘Blatant Discrimination Disappears, But ...’: The Politics of Everyday Exclusion in Contemporary Japan,” Asian Perspective 35, no. 2 (2011): 287–308.
[v] Sayuri Umeda, “Japan: New Act Targets Hate Speech Against Persons from Outside Japan | Global Legal Monitor,” Library of Congress Law, August 31, 2016, //www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/japan-new-act-targets-hate-speech-against-persons-from-outside-japan/.
[vi] (blog), 2019, https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/japan/.
[vii] Narzary, Dharitri Chakravartty. “The Myths of Japanese ‘Homogeneity.’” China Report 40, no. 3 (August 2004): 311–19. https://doi.org/10.1177/000944550404000308.
[viii] Yaechen Lee, “Japan’s North Korean Diaspora,” The Diplomat, January 5, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/japans-north-korean-diaspora/.
[ix] Sonia Ryang and John Lie, “Diaspora without Homeland: Being Korean in Japan,” UC Berkeley, April 1, 2009, 1–20.
[x] Rennie Moon, “Koreans in Japan,” Stanford SPICE, 2010, https://spice.fsi.stanford.edu/docs/koreans_in_japan.
[xi] Ryang, Sonia. "Space and Time: The Experience Of The "Zainichi", The Ethnic Korean Population of Japan." Urban Anthropology and Studies of Cultural Systems and World Economic Development 43, no. 4 (2014): 519-50. Accessed November 8, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24643204.
[xii] John Lie, Zainichi (Koreans in Japan): Diasporic Nationalism and Postcolonial Identity (University of California Press, 2008), https://escholarship.org/content/qt7qr1c5x7/qt7qr1c5x7_noSplash_8b5887eeb590978317416a0de3057740.pdf.
[xiii]Apichai W. Shipper, “Nationalisms of and Against Zainichi Koreans in Japan,” Wiley Online Library, January 8, 2010, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1943-0787.2009.01167.x.
[xiv] Soo im Lee, “Diversity of Zainichi Koreans and Their Ties to Japan and Korea,” Studies on Multicultural Societies, no. 8 (2012): 1–28.
[xv] , February 21, 2019, https://www.bangkokpost.com/world/1632646/paradise-on-earth-ghost-of-n-korea-propaganda-still-haunts.
[xvi] 한기범, “North Korea’s South Korea Policy: An Evaluation of Determining Variables and Prospects for 2012,” International Journal of Korean Unification Studies, 2011, https://www.dbpia.co.kr/Journal/articleDetail?nodeId=NODE08827442.
[xvii] Rennie Moon, “Koreans in Japan,” Stanford SPICE, 2010, https://spice.fsi.stanford.edu/docs/koreans_in_japan.
[xviii] Ryuta Itagaki, “The Anatomy of Korea-Phobia in Japan,” Japanese Studies 35, no. 1 (January 2, 2015): 49–66, https://doi.org/10.1080/10371397.2015.1007496.
[xix] Moon, “Koreans in Japan.”
[xx] Don Baker, “North Koreans in Japan: Language, Ideology, and Identity,” Pacific Affairs; Vancouver 71, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 114–15, http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2760846.
[xxi] Yalla Venkata Surya Rama Narasimha and Rushabh Kotecha, “Chongryon’s Scenario in Japan,” International Journal for Advance Research and Development 3, no. 1 (January 31, 2018), https://www.ijarnd.com/manuscript/chongryons-scenario-in-japan/.
[xxii] Baker, “North Koreans in Japan.”
[xxiii] Kaori H. Okano, “North Koreans in Japan: Language, Ideology, and Identity,” American Ethnologist 29, no. 4 (2002): 1008–9, https://doi.org/10.1525/ae.2002.29.4.1008.
[xxiv] Johnny Harris, Inside North Korea’s Bubble in Japan, Vox Borders, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qBfyIQbxXPs&t=524s.
[xxv] Narasimha and Kotecha, “Chongryon’s Scenario in Japan.”
[xxvi] Armie Rosen, “The Strange Rise and Fall of North Korea’s Business Empire in Japan,” The Atlantic, July 26, 2012, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/07/the-strange-rise-and-fall-of-north-koreas-business-empire-in-japan/260373/
[xxvii] Dewayne J. Creamer, “The Rise and Fall of Chosen Soren : Its Effect on Japan’s Relations on the Korean Peninsula” (Thesis, Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, 2003), https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/6216.
[xxviii] Kaori Kaneko et al., “Japan Offers North Korea Summit, Pyongyang Discussing Meetings with Japan,” Reuters, March 28, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-japan/japan-offers-north-korea-summit-pyongyang-discussing-meetings-with-japan-asahi-idUSKBN1H43E9.
[xxix] Kim Jong-un, “Comrade Kim Jong-Un’s Rojak,” Chongryon, May 25, 2015, http://www.chongryon.com/newyear2015/sohan60.html.
[xxx] Yaechen Lee, “Japan’s North Korean Diaspora,” The Diplomat, January 5, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/japans-north-korean-diaspora/.
[xxxi] Lee.
